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STATEMENT OF ISSOE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The only

issue presented

in this appeal

is whether the

weight of the evidence supports the Trial Court's conclusion of
accord and satisfaction.
STATOTORY PROVISIONS
There are no statutory or constitutional provisions whose
interpretation

is

necessary

to

determine

the

accord

and

Civil

and

satisfaction issue.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Appellant,

an

overseas

employee

of

Bechtel

Minerals, Inc. ("Bechtel"), from May 1981 until January 1983f
sought to collect S9f126.22 in the Trial Court that he claimed
Bechtel owed as compensation in the form of "uplifts".
Complaint,

Record

at

36).

The

"uplifts"

were

(Amended

part

of

a

compensation package that Bechtel provided to overseas employees
to

insure

Affidavit,
during

a

certain

Record

at

the period

level

of

66-67).

that

after-tax
Bechtel

appellant

was

income.

adjusted
employed

claimed he was damaged by the adjustment.

(Morgan

this package
and

appellant

(Amended Complaint,

Record at 36) .
Bechtel

denied

appellant's

purported

injury

because

his

after-tax income was not adversely affected by the adjustment.
Bechtel
purported

raised

three

contract

additional
upon

which

defenses, including:
appellant

based

his

(1) the
claim

specifically permitted the adjustment; and (2) the appellant was

E &

PRATT
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*LAZA
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an employee at will not entitled to make the claim; and, (3) an
accord

and

satisfaction

barred

plaintiff's

claim.

(Answer,

Record at 49-52; Bechtelfs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record at
64-65).

x

Bechtel moved for summary

judgment on these defenses and

supported its motion with the deposition of appellant (Record at
193) and an affidavit of Patrick V. Morgan, Manager of Personnel
for Bechtel Civil and Minerals (Record at 65). In the hearing on
the motion both parties agreed no fact disputes would preclude
the Court from ruling and agreed the evidence then before the
Court

could

act

as

the

trial

evidence.

Based

on

that

stipulationf the Trial Court directed that the matter proceed to
trial on the evidence then in the record.

(Record at 112 and

122) .
Appellant

and

Respondent

proffered

that

evidence

presented final arguments on the day of the trial.
122).

and

(Record at

The Trial Court reviewed the evidence in detail and issued

a well-reasoned

memorandum

decision which held an accord and

satisfaction barred appellant's claim.

(Record at 123-126).

The

evidence upon which the Court based its opinion is set forth in
its Memorandum Decision and its Findings of Pact.
123-226f 174-178).
that

Bechtel

(Record at

The Decision and the Findings demonstrate

proposed

to

alter

its

compensation

package

in

accordance with its compensation policy as a result of a dramatic
change in the tax laws.

Y D E 8e P R A T T
ORNEYSATLAW
MERICAN SAVINGS
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change the level of uplifts.

As a result of appellant's claims

Bechtel offered and plaintiff accepted a new compensation package
which provided substantial benefits to appellant that he would
not have been entitled to receive under the original compensation
package.

(Record at 153).

Appellant objected to certain Findings of Fact and moved the
Court for an Order to amend its Memorandum Decision.
170) .

(Record at

The Objections and Motion came on for hearing and the

Trial Court again heard and fully considered appellant's claim
that the evidence did not support an accord and satisfaction.
The Court
Motion

denied

(Record

at

appellant's
172

and

Objections
173)

and

(Record

entered

at 155) and

its

Order

and

Judgment, no cause of action (Record at 156).
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
Appellant has raised two non-issues in an effort to convince
this Court to depart from the traditional rule that it is the
Trial Court's perogative to determine the facts and its decision
will be upheld if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to
support its version of the facts.
Western

Railroad,

Santi v. Denver & Rio Grande

21 Utah 2d 157f 442 P.2d

921, 923

(1968).

First, although appellant concedes he agreed to the stipulated
trial procedure, the appellant now suggests this Court review the
evidence as the fact finder because of the stipulated procedure.
Second,

appellant

suggests he did not have a hearing on the

Findings of Fact and asks this Court to review those findings.
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(Appellantfs Opening Brief 14-16).

Neither suggestion has merit.

Plaintiff stipulated to the procedure and the evidencef which was
substantial and competent.

(Record at 122).

Appellant cannot

claim that procedure was not appropriate at this point and ask
this Court to substitute its judgment for the Trial Court and
Furtherf appellantfs claim that he did not

re-review the facts.

have an opportunity to object to the Courtfs Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is plain wrong.

The record is clear that

appellant formally objected and received a full hearing in which
his

Objections

to

the

Decision

and

completely considered and rejected.

Findings

of

Fact

were

(Record at 0155).

Further, as shown below, the Trial Court properly rejected
appellantfs

Objections

and

Motion.

The

following

numbered

paragraphs indicate the Judgment should be upheld because the
weight of the evidence amply supports the Court's well-reasoned
Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Order and Judgment.

See Egbert and Jaynes v. R.C. Tolman, 680

P.2d 746 (Utah 1984).
1.
entered

On

or

into

conditions

at

about
an
that

March

30, 1981f

employment
time,

appellant

relationship.

including

The

plaintiffs

and

Bechtel

employment
compensation

package, were set out in a Recital of International Employment
Conditions, a tax letter

and Employment

Conditions - Jubail,

Saudi Arabia, where plaintiff worked as an auditor from May 1,
1981 until January 31, 1983. (Findings of Fact, No. 1; Record at

YDE & PRATT
ORNEYS AT LAW
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175; Bench Depo. at pp. 25-30 Findings of Pactf No. 6; Record at
176) .
2.

The

Recital, Tax Letter

and Employment

Conditions -

Jubailr Saudi Arabia, indicate Bechtelfs compensation policy for
overseas employees was designed to provide a certain level of
after tax take home pay (Morgan Affidavitf Record at 66 and 67).
3.

To reach this goalf the compensation policy originally

provided for certain uplifts in a base salary.

These uplifts

included a foreign service premium of 7.5% base salary, a special
area allowance and a "completion incentive" paid annually based
on a percentage of base salary paid that year.

(Memorandum

Decision, Record at 123; Bench Depo.f pp. 13-15r Record at 194).
The compensation policy also provided that plaintiff would be
eligible

to

receive

twenty-four

months

thereafter.

These

other
of

benefits

employment

additional

only
and

benefits

upon

on

completion

an

annual

included

uplift, accrued vacation, return transportation
States,

shipment

relocation.

of

household

effects

and

of

basis

an incentive
to the United

allowances

for

(Memorandum Decision, Record at 124; Findings of

Fact, No. 5, Record at 0175; Bench Depo. at p. 13f Record at
184; Argument of Appellant's counsel, Record at 31).
4.

In August,

1981f

after

appellant

began

to work

for

Bechtelr the United States Congress enacted the Economic Recovery
Tax Act (ERTA) (H.R. 424, 97th Congress; Public Law 97-34) which
took effect on January 1, 1982 and altered the tax structure upon

E & PRATT
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1

which defendants compensation package was based.

(Findings of

Fact, No. 6, Record at 0176; Morgan Affidavit, Record at 67 and
68) .
5.
v

Bechtel revised its compensation package in light of the

Economic

Recovery

eliminated
Morgan

Tax

others.

Affidavit,

Act

and

adjusted

some

uplifts

and

(Findings of Fact, No. 7, Record at 76;
Record

at

67

and

68).

As

a

result of

appellantfs and others disputing whether Bechtel could adjust the
uplifts, the package of changes also included a change in the
benefits which provided

appellant

could quit

and

immediately

receive the benefits Bechtel formerly agreed to pay only upon
completion

of

twenty-four

months of

employment.

(Memorandum

Decision, Record at 124; Finding of Fact, No. 7, Record at 176;
Bench Depo., p. 61, Record at 194). Appellant had been in Saudi
Arabia for seven months at the time the package was offered.
(Memorandum Decision, Record at 123).
6.

Bechtel informed appellant of the proposed adjustment in

a meeting with employees prior to the time the adjustments were
to take effect.

(Bench Depo., page 52, Record at 193). Upon the

request of appellant and others, Bechtel agreed to extend the
option to quit and receive the benefits upon the completion of
eighteen months.

The plaintiff sought this because at eighteen

months he would qualify for a $75,000.00 tax exemption allowed
under the new law to foreign service employees.
62, Record at 193).

YDE & PRATT
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(Bench Depo., p.

7.
about

Appellant
November

accepted the new package of benefits on or
10 f

1982

(Memorandum Decisionf

after

serving

eighteen

months.

Record at 124; Findings of Factf No. 9r

Record at 176; Bench Depo.f p. 66, Record at 193). Accordingly,
appellant

received

the benefits

of the adjusted

compensation

policy, including, inter alia, return to point of origin benefits
Of

$2f500.00f

$3,986.97f

a

payment

pro
for

rata

completion

accrued

vacation

incentive
of

payment

of

$1,302.38, cost

differential of $292.66 and insurance of $155.40.

(Findings of

Factf No. 8r Record at 181; Bench Depo.f pp. 70-77f Record at
193) .

Bechtel had no obligation under the original employment

conditions or otherwise to pay these benefits to appellant.

It

had offered them under the adjusted benefit package and appellant
accepted the offer.
8.

(Bench Depo.r p. 77f Record at 193).

Appellant made no objection to any changes or reductions

in his pay at the time he accepted the adjusted benefit package.
Indeed, in the letter accepting the package the appellant wrote:
It has been a pleasure working with you in the audit
group here at Jubail and I would look forward to
working with you in the future. I appreciate your help
and consideration in this matter.
(Memorandum Decision, Record at 123; Findings of Fact, No. 10,
Record at 182; Bench Depo.f at p. 67f Record at 193).

Further,

at no time during his employment between May 1, 1981, and January
31, 1983, did plaintiff make a written or oral demand for the
monies or take any other action to collect the monies he now
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claims were not paid as a result of the adjustments and changes.
(Memorandum Decisionf

Record at 123; Finding of Factf

No. 8f

Record at 176) . Instead, he continued to work for Bechtel for an
additional

eleven

months

benefit package.
9.

At

executed

a

including

the

under

the adjusted

compensation

and

(Memorandum Decision, Record at 123).
time

sheet
uplifts,

appellant

which

set

and

the

Appellant acknowledged

terminated

out

the

his

final

additional

employment

wages

benefits

he

receivedf
received.

receipt of these monies by signing the

sheet which contained an express statement that plaintifffs final
check, which included uplifts and the adjusted compensation, was
to be drawn to the order of Plaintiff "in settlement of net final
wages11.

(Memorandum Decision, Record at 124; Findings of Factf

No. 11f Record at 177; Bench Depo.f pp. 70-71f Exhibit 15f Record
at 193).
10.

The benefits in the new adjusted package were in fact

paid to appellant by a check which expressly stated that it was
"in settlement of net final wages".

(Memorandum Decision, Record

at 124; Findings of Fact No. 12, Record at 177; Bench Depo.f p.
73> Exhibit 18, Record at 193).

Bechtel tendered this check as

the last payment under its compensation package with appellant
and as full settlement of net final wages.
Record at 68) .

Appellant knew Bechtel claimed the check was in

settlement of net final wages.
8-9) .

(Appellant's Opening Brief at

Appellant accepted and negotiated it, without comment or

objection.
Y D E 8c P R A T T
ORNEYS AT LAW
MER1CAN SAVINGS
PLAZA
:ST SECOND SOUTH
1LT LAKE CITY.
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11.
check

It was not

and

received

until
the

appellant had quitf

substantial

benefits

negotiated the

provided

in the

adjusted compensation policy that he demanded the monies he now
claims.

(Bench Depo. at 95-96, Record at 193).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts completely and fully support the Trial Court's
Memorandum Decisionr

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

Final Order and Judgment.

The evidence shows appellant disputed

whether Bechtel could change its benefit packagef a point that
appellant repeats in his brief.

Bechtel offered the adjusted

compensation package to resolve the dispute with appellant and
others.

The adjusted compensation package provided appellant the

option to quit early and still receive substantial benefits or to
continue under the modified compensation plan.

Appellant would

not have been entitled to receive the benefits offered until he
had completed twenty four months in this assignment.
accepted

the

offered

early

reservation or objection.

completion

benefits

Appellant

without

any

He negotiated the final paycheck that

was tendered in settlement of net final wages which included the
offered benefits.

Under the law enunciated by this Court there

was an accord and satisfaction and appellant's claim is barred.
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ARGDMENT
The Evidence Substantially Supports the Finding of Accord
And Satisfaction,
The evidence substantially supports the finding of the Trial
Court of an accord and satisfaction.
as set

forth by this Court

An accord and satisfaction

in Sugarhouse Finance Company v.

Andersonr 610 P.2d 1369f 1372 (Utah 1980) occurs:
[wlhere the parties to an agreement resolve that a
given performance by one party theretof offered in
substitution of the performance originally agreed upon,
will discharge the obligation created under the
original agreement. Essential to its validity aref (1)
a proper subject matter; (2) competent parties; (3) an
assent or a meeting of the minds of the parties; and
(4) a consideration given for the accord. Where the
underlying
claim
is
disputed
or
uncertain
("unliquidated"), the obligors assent to the definite
statement of performance in the accord amounts to
sufficient consideration as it constitutes a surrender
of the right to dispute the initial obligation. Where,
however, the underlying claim is liquidated and certain
as to amount, separate consideration must be found to
support the accord; otherwise the obligor binds himself
to do nothing he was not already obligated to dof and
the obligees promise to accept a substitute performance
is unenforceable.
There was a proper subject matter in this case.

There was a

compensation package and a dispute arose between appellant and
Bechtel over it.

(Record at 231) .

As a result of the dispute,

Bechtel offered an adjusted compensation

package to appellant

which provided the right to terminate early and receive immediate
substantial additional benefits that were formerly allowed only
upon

the

completion

of

two years

of

assignment.

Appellant

accepted this option and received and accepted those benefits
without reservation or further objection.

YDE a PRATT
ORNEYS AT LAW
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The evidence clearly shows the parties were competent.

The

plaintiff at the time was a highly paid experienced certified
public accountant who had worked for Peat, Marwick, and Mitchell
prior to working for Bechtel.
00193) .

(Bench Depo.f p. 5-15, Record at

He had also been a principal and director in an oil

exploration

company.

His

responsibilities

in

that

position

included, inter alia, accounting and day-to-day operations for
the

company.

Id.

appellant's brief

Further,

that Bechtel

despite

the

implications

in

could take undue advantage of

appellant by stranding him in Saudi Arabia (Appellant's Opening
Brief at 11) , there is no evidence of that occurring.

Indeed,

counsel for appellant indicated to the Trial Court there was no
evidence to suggest that Bechtel ever threatened or represented
to appellant that appellant had to accept Bechtel's offer or he
would be stranded in Saudi Arabia.

(Record at 220) .

Rather,

both parties were aware of the facts and the matter was "resolved
in each of their respective best interests".

(Plaintiff's Memo,

in Opposition to Summary Judgment, page 5, Record at 131).
Further, there

is no doubt that there was an offer and

acceptance of a substitute performance.

Appellant has always

acknowledged that there was an agreed "quid pro quo" between the
parties.

(Plaintiff's Memo, in Opposition to Summary Judgment,

page 11, Record at 136).

The appellant accepted substantial

benefits as part of this "quid pro quo".

E & PRATT
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The significance of this acceptance is two fold.
it

clear

that

appellant

received

the

separate

It makes

consideration

necessary for an accord and satisfaction of a liquidated sum.
Sugarhouse Finance Companyf supray at 1372.

It also shows there

was an agreement in which both parties understood all claims were
resolved.

x

Appellant

termination which

signed

included

the

uplifts

sheet

at

the

time

of

his

and other new benefits in

reaching a total amount of "net final wages" and which directed
appellantfs final check be issued "in settlement of net final
wages".

"Wages"f as the Trial Court remarked after doing its own

researchr includes every form of renumeration payable for a given
period.

The adjusted uplifts and adjusted benefits were in fact

paid in a check which denominated them as wages and which was in
settlement of "net final wages'1.

Bechtel tendered this check as

net final wages and appellant knew Bechtel tendered it as net
final wages.

Appellant, without reservationf receivedf acceptedf

endorsed and cashed the check.
The evidence, construed on appeal in a light favorable to
Bechtelf shows the Trial Court properly found there was an accord
and satisfaction as that term has been defined in previous cases.
See e.g., Martin Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985)
(holding a builder's cashing of a check containing the condition
^

t

that "endorsement hereof constitutes full and final satisfaction"
was

an

accord

and

satisfaction where

there was a bona fide

dispute as to the amount owing even though the builder had struck

YDE a

PRATT
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the conditional endorsement and wrote "not full payment" prior to
negotiating the check); Sugarhouse Finance Company v. Anderson,
610

P. 2d

1369

(Utah

1980)

(separate

consideration

supported

accord and satisfaction where benefits were bestowed upon the
plaintiff); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Buildf Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80,
404 P.2d 670 (1968).

In so finding the Trial Court followed the

sound policies of this Court and the modern trend adopted by
others

to

uphold

agreements

appellant and Bechtel.
1369, 1372

(1980) .

like

the

one

entered

into

by

Sugarhouse Finance v. Anderson, 610 P.2d
The law favors compromise and accord and

satisfaction achieves this goal by upholding these agreements.
Martin Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985).
In
position

addition
would

to

ignoring

violate

this

sound

policyf

appellant's

the principle of promissory

estoppel,

which the Court has also invoked in instances like this one:
We notef in addition [to accord and satisfaction]f that
this jurisdiction recognizes the doctrine of promissory
estoppel, whereby an individual who has made a promise
which the individual should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance on the part of the promisee . . .
and which does evidence action or forbearance is
estopped to deny or repudiate the promise should the
promisee . . . suffer detriment thereby.
Sugarhouse
Finance v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369f 1373 (1980).
Bechtel agreed to pay certain sums pursuant to the accord,
in reliance on appellant accepting the sums in settlement of his
claims.

It tendered the adjusted benefits for that purpose and

appellant knew it intended them for that purpose and he accepted
them in resolution of this claim.

>E & P R A T T
NEYS AT LAW
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denying his agreement and asserting this claim for additional
compensation.
The cases upon which defendant relies do not relieve the
appellant from the logical and sound result reached by the Trial
Court.

For instancef appellant cites the case of Messick v. PHD

Trucking Servicer Inc.f 615 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1980).

Reliance is

misplaced because that case did not involve one transaction like
this case.

In Messick, a plaintiff lessor under a truck leasing

agreementf brought an action to compel the defendant lessee to
account for payments due and owing to plaintiff under the lease.
The facts demonstrated that the plaintiff had purchased the truck
from two principles of the defendant.

The plaintiff then sold

the truck back to the defendants in a transaction but there was
"no indication that this transaction was intended to offset any
amounts owing under the lease agreement11,

Id.

at 1277.

Despite

this fact, the defendants attempted to bar plaintiff's claims on
the lease by urging an accord and satisfaction occurred with
respect to all dealings between the parties.
to permit

The Court refused

this because the settlement of one claim does not

result in the accord and satisfaction of anther claim based on
"different types of transactions".

Id. at 1277-78.

A similar

result was reached in another case upon which appellant relies.
Bennett v. Robinsonfs Medical Martf

Inc.f 18 Utah 2d 186f 417

P.2d

Martin

761

(1966)

(distinguished

in

Remodelingf

because it involved separate claims).
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supra,

These cases are not applicable because there were not two
claims in dispute in this case.

It is clear that an agreement

was reached based on an adjustment in compensation under which
Bechtel provided separate consideration to plaintiff.

The check

by which that consideration and uplifts were paid included the
uplifts as part of "wages" and was in "settlement of net final
wages".

The hand pays sheet that Mr. Bench signed included

uplifts in reaching a total amount of "net final wages".

There

is no doubt that all considered this one transaction and the
subsequent agreement to apply to it.
Appellant also relies on Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275,
437 P.2d 202 (Utah 1968) in which the Court denied a claim for
wages

because

the

plaintiffs

had

failed

preponderance of evidence the amounts due.*
apply to this case either.

to

prove

by

a

Hintze does not

In Hintze the defendant attempted to

avoid an obligation to pay commissions of an unliquidated sum by
sending a check on which it stated "this is the balance of your
account in full".
accord

and

The Court held that this did not constitute an

satisfaction

because

the mere denomination

of "a

balance" upon an account rendered was not sufficient to suggest
that the check was to be accepted in full satisfaction of the
pending claim.

In this case there is no doubt that both parties

knew the checks were tendered
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in full satisfaction of wages.

* It should be noted that in this case the plaintiff
offered no direct proof on amounts he claimed were due and
Bechtel has always alleged that it did not owe any monies to the
Plaintiff. The Trial Court did not reach these issues because
* t s decision on accord and satisfaction was dispositive.
. 1
C .
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Alsor

contrary

to Hintzef

there was additional

offered because a dispute had arisen.

consideration

Thus, neither Hintze nor

any of the other cases relied upon apply to these circumstances.
See, e.g., Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 560 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1977) (at the time checks were negotiated the plaintiffs
were unaware that a dispute existed); Tates v. Little America
Refining

Co., 535 P.2d

plaintiff

knew

that

1228

the

(Utah 1975)

check

was

(no indication

being

that

offered

in

full

Conder

is

well

satisfaction of the debt owed).
CONCLOSION
The

legal

supported.

conclusion

reached

by

Judge

Bechtel is not liable to plaintiff for any amounts

claimed due because the acceptance without reservation of the
offer for the adjusted compensation package and the negotiation
of the final payment of completion benefits before twenty four
months of employment constitutes an accord and satisfaction.
The statements and arguments of plaintiff's brief to the
contrary are unsupported or erroneous.

For instance, plaintiff

suggests that the terms of his employment required defendant to
terminate it by giving one monthfs written notice.

The facts

clearly establish that there was no need for one month1s notice
because

the

employment.
off"

plaintiff,

Bechtel,

chose

the

There

purported

employment

ORNEYS AT LAW
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terminate

is no citation

contract

his

by

mutual

to the record for such an

assertion and the facts are directly contrary.
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Similarly, plaintiff suggests that defendant "backed

modifying

agreement.

not

-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There was a mutual agreement in this case between appellant
and Bechtel as to the adjusted compensation package.
received

substantial

benefits

under

package pursuant to the agreement.

the adjusted

Appellant

compensation

Neither the lawf equity or

good conscience will allow appellant to receive those benefits
and pursue

his claim.

The Trial

Courtfs opinion

should be

upheld.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of Decemberf 1986.

CLYDE & PRATT

ieven E. Clyde
James L. Warlaumont
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